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Abstract 
 
Governments and domestic banks in Europe have attracted criticism due to the heightening 
inclination of banks to hold more local sovereign debt in the midst of the crisis. This has 
traditionally been interpreted as an evidence of financial repression or moral suasion. By using 
a novel dataset on bank-level exposures to sovereign and private debt covering the entire 
Eurozone crisis, I confirm that sovereign debt has been reallocated from foreign to domestic 
banks at the peak of the crisis. Furthermore, this reallocation has been especially visible for 
banks as opposed to other domestic private agents and cannot be explained by the risk-shifting 
tendency of the banks located in troubled countries. However, in contrast to the previous 
literature focusing only on sovereign debt, I show that banks’ private sector exposures have 
suered (at least) equally from a rising home bias. Finally, I present a direct information 
channel and demonstrate that foreign banks – free from moral suasion – located in 
informationally closer territories have relatively increased their exposures to crisis-countries. 
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Domestic banks as lightning rods?  
Home bias during the Eurozone crisis 
 
 
‘The same personal and professional ties that may allow sovereigns to apply 
moral suasion on domestic banks might also give domestic bankers better 
information about the likelihood of sovereign default or repayment.’ 
Ethan Ilzetzki, in Economic Policy Discussion Panel (2014) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Can domestic banks act as lightning rods in the midst of a stormy financial 
climate? On the contrary, by now the deathly loop between sovereign and bank 
credit risks has been well documented, especially in the context of the recent 
Eurozone crises. Increasing risk pressures in the banking sector put 
unnecessary burdens on public finances due to potential future bailout costs 
and negative spillovers to the lending in the real economy. In turn, a spike in 
the sovereign credit risk might trigger a deterioration in bank finances through 
losses on banks’ government bond holdings and the loss of credibility for 
future government support (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014). Many 
studies have already pointed out that European banks’ relatively high exposure 
to sovereign debt has led them to decrease the loan supply in their respective 
territories, thus transferring the financial turmoil to the real economy (Acharya, 
Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch, 2016a; Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli, 2016; 
Popov and Van Horen, 2015). 
One of the most interesting observations, however, was the banks’ escalating 
home bias for sovereign debt, especially in crisis countries. That is, at the peak 
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of the government debt problems, banks started accumulating local 
government bonds. Figure 1 illustrates the initial rise and the gradual reversal 
 
Figure 1 
Home bias in core and periphery Euro countries during crisis. 
The graph shows simple country averages of home bias and bond spreads for each country group. 
Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by its domestic 
banks. Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily bond spreads for a country (with respect 
to Germany) over the 3-month period before each observation date. Sovereign bond exposure data 
come from various stress-tests, transparency and recapitalization exercises undertaken by the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) and include 10 observation dates from 2010-Quarter1 to 
2015-Quarter2 (see Table 1). Bond yields are obtained from Datastream. Core (non-crisis) 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) 
countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 
 
of this trend – alongside with the respective bond spreads – in the Eurozone 
periphery. In contrast, the corresponding bias in core Eurozone countries 
seems to have been more or less stable throughout the crisis. Intriguingly, the 
observation still stands in Figure 2 even after correcting for how much of the 
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domestic debt the banks should hold in a standard Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM).1 
 
Figure 2 
Home bias (CAPM-adjusted) in core and periphery  
Eurozone countries during crisis 
 
The graph shows simple country averages of home bias and bond spreads for each country group. 
Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by its domestic 
banks, after taking into account the portfolio size of these domestic banks according to a standard 
portfolio (CAPM) model (see Data Description). Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily 
bond spreads for a country (with respect to Germany) over the 3-month period before each 
observation date. Sovereign bond exposure data come from various stress-tests, transparency and 
recapitalization exercises undertaken by the EBA and include 10 observation dates from 2010-
Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2 (see Table 1). Bond yields are obtained from Datastream. Core (non-
crisis) countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) 
countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain. 
 
With the dismal interaction between sovereign and banking crises in the 
background, most of the recent literature attributed this observation to the 
argument of financial repression/moral suasion (Becker and Ivashina, 2014; De 
Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Ongena, Popov, and Van Horen, 2016). In other 
                                                 
 
1 As discussed later in the Data section, a simple asset pricing model would predict that banks must 
hold sovereign debt in proportion to the relative weight of their sovereign portfolio in the universe 
of total sovereign bond holdings. 
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words, in order to gain relief from the crisis and to be able to rollover their 
debts, governments may have (implicitly) forced the banks in their jurisdiction 
to increase domestic sovereign exposures. Pointing to the highly positive 
correlations between government-relatedness2 and public bond holdings of the 
banks, these papers argue that there has been a clear tendency of troubled 
governments to impose moral suasion on the banks that they can control. From 
this perspective, the resulting home bias has been mostly involuntary for 
domestic banks and created an unnecessary burden on the financial health of 
the banking sectors in crisis countries.  
Another competing argument for the repatriation of public debt from non-
crisis to crisis countries is based on the assumption that governments would be 
less willing to default if their debt was held by domestic rather than foreign 
agents due to the costs such a default would inflict on the domestic economy 
(Broner, Martin, and Ventura, 2010; Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi, 2014b). 
Hence, in the existence of well-functioning secondary markets, sovereign debt 
should naturally be reallocated back to host countries as domestic agents will 
attach a higher value to these securities than their foreign counterparts. 
According to this view, the resulting home bias has been a dark side-eect of 
secondary bond markets and might even have benefited the creditors if it 
eventually decreased governments’ willingness to default. With respect to this 
argument, Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the home bias for dierent types 
of domestic agents in periphery and core Euro countries. Although it is clear 
that resident banks in the periphery accumulated a big portion of domestic 
debt, this is hardly true for other residents in the same countries, which goes 
                                                 
 
2  Either through direct government ownership of the bank or political links in the board of 
directors. 
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against the intuition of Broner et al. (2010) and asks for a further link between 
resident banks and government debt. 
In this paper, I propose an alternative channel and show that European banks’ 
increasing sovereign home bias in crisis countries is not so surprising if one 
takes into account one of the most conventional (albeit lately forgotten) theories 
of the home bias in asset markets: informational frictions (Brennan and Cao, 
1997; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009; Dziuda and Mondria, 2012). As 
is true for most asset classes, home bias usually exists when there is an 
informational advantage in favour of domestic agents. In tranquil periods and 
well-integrated markets such as in Europe, one would not expect to observe a 
high level of home bias. Nonetheless, in crisis episodes during which domestic 
agents are likely to gain an informational advantage over their foreign peers, 
one would expect the home bias to rise since foreign agents would be more 
likely to react negatively to bad news (Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu, 2005). 
This is especially true if the crisis episodes are associated with large scale 
market panic as illustrated by recent studies of the Eurozone (De Grauwe and 
Ji, 2013; Saka, Fuertes, and Kalotychou, 2015). If this view is correct, one would 
expect to see sovereign debt to be reallocated especially to local banks rather 
than other domestic agents due to the strong informational linkages between 
banks and governments. In fact, if the information channel was operational, it 
is expected that the reallocation would be concentrated on banks that were 
closely linked to the government. Hence, based on such empirical findings the 
conclusions of the above-mentioned studies arguing in favour of the moral 
suasion hypothesis might be biased in the absence of an explicit control for the 
information channel. 
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Figure 3 
Home bias for resident banks and non-bank residents during crisis 
 
The graph shows simple country averages of home bias separately for resident banks and 
nonbank residents of each country in the group (core vs. periphery). Home Bias is defined 
as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country held by a particular resident group. 
Sovereign debt exposures come from the dataset compiled from various national sources 
by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and include quarterly observations from 2010-
Quarter1 to 2014-Quarter4. Core (non-crisis) countries: Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany and Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain. Data for Belgium and Finland can only be found annually; so these data are linearly 
interpolated in order to obtain quarterly values. 
 
By taking a global portfolio approach and using a novel bank-level dataset 
compiled from various stress-tests, transparency and capital exercises of the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), I first show that European banks’ home 
bias increased and sovereign debt was indeed reallocated from foreign to 
domestic banks at the peak of the crisis. Consistent with Acharya and Steen 
(2015) and Crosignani (2015), I also find evidence of risk-shifting behaviour for 
banks located in crisis countries. However, it is also shown that home bias goes 
much beyond this behaviour. Interestingly, and in contrast with the secondary 
market theory of Broner et al. (2010), this reallocation does not seem to be 
visible at all for domestic agents other than banks. This is compatible with the 
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information asymmetry theory of home bias given the informational 
advantages that banks enjoy in comparison with other local agents in 
government debt markets. Additionally, I illustrate that, in response to the 
crisis, private forms of debt (retail and corporate) on bank balance sheets have 
experienced an equally large (if not larger) increase in home bias. This is in 
sharp contradiction to the moral suasion story unless one assumes that 
corporate/retail borrowers can somehow force the domestic banks to lend to 
them. On the other hand, this finding is exactly what one would expect from 
informationally more sensitive assets (such as private debt) if crisis episodes 
were associated with informational frictions. Finally, I present a direct 
information channel and demonstrate that foreign banks – free from moral 
suasion – headquartered in informationally closer territories have increased 
their relative exposures to troubled countries during the crisis. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper is only compatible with the 
conventional theory of increasing informational asymmetries between 
domestic and foreign agents during crisis. Thus, answering the question in the 
beginning, it is possible that domestic banks may have acted as lightning rods 
collecting the sovereign debt while governments were suering from 
informational frictions as foreign banks left the market in panic, triggering a 
financial storm. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly outlines 
the relevant background literature. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical 
methodology and results are presented in section 4. The final section concludes. 
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2. The related literature 
2.1 Recent home bias in the Eurozone 
The main motivation of the paper comes from the recently aroused academic 
and policy interest in the causes of rising fragmentation – home bias – across 
Eurozone sovereign debt markets. One of the earlier contributions by Becker 
and Ivashina (2014) illustrates the positive association between country-level 
government ownership in the banking sector and domestic government bond 
holdings of the banks. They further extend this finding by showing the 
significance of the positive relationship between government-relatedness of the 
banks’ board members and government bond holdings in crisis-country banks. 
De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) follow a similar path to point out that, upon 
receiving liquidity injections, only politically-related European banks 
increased their exposure to domestic sovereign debt. Using a proprietary bank-
level dataset from the European Central Bank (ECB), Ongena et al. (2016) 
demonstrate that, compared to foreign ones, domestic banks were more 
inclined to increase their exposures when governments had to rollover large 
chunks of outstanding public debt. Many other recent papers confirm these 
observations (Horváth, Huizinga, and Ioannidou, 2015; Altavilla et al., 2016) 
and conclude that a moral suasion channel was in operation during the 
Eurozone crisis. 3  Nonetheless, none of these studies take into account the 
possible information channel that might have been active between 
governments and related banks. I contribute to this literature first by presenting 
evidence on the equally rising home bias for asset classes other than sovereign 
                                                 
 
3 These findings are not always consistent though. For example, using the same source of data as 
in Ongena et al. (2016), Altavilla et al. (2016) find evidence for moral suasion also in core Euro 
countries, which ex-post is hard to reconcile with the observation that these countries did not have 
any difficulty in rolling over their debts at the time. 
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debt and then by illustrating that the information channel was operational even 
in the sovereign exposures of foreign banks. 
Another strand of the home bias literature specific to sovereign debt underlines 
the assumption that it is harder for governments to default on their promises 
when most of the debt is held domestically. In such a scenario, a government 
would rather choose not to default since the benefits could be offset by its harm 
to the domestic economy. Hence, in the local agents’ expectation of this, 
government debt will flow back to the host country in times of crisis (Broner et 
al., 2010). Analysing a vast database covering 191 countries, Gennaioli, Martin, 
and Rossi (2014a) show empirical patterns consistent with this prediction 
although they cannot differentiate between domestic and foreign bonds at the 
bank-level. In a recent paper, Brutti and Sauré (2016) present confirming 
evidence in the context of the Eurozone crisis by demonstrating that 
reallocation was more intense for sovereign than private debt. Furthermore, the 
debt of the crisis governments tended toward those banks whose countries 
were politically more powerful in the Euro area, implying that debt reallocation 
was mainly driven to discourage the troubled governments from declaring 
bankruptcy. By using a dataset covering the entire Eurozone crisis episode for 
30 European countries at the bank-level, I complement and challenge these 
findings: I find that the reallocation of sovereign debt did indeed occur during 
the Eurozone crisis. This, however, only holds for domestic banks, not other 
domestic agents, which goes against the earlier prediction of Broner et al. 
(2010). Furthermore, compared to government debt, retail and corporate debt 
on bank balance sheets suffered equally (if not more) from an increase in home 
bias in response to the crisis. This is hard to reconcile with the earlier finding 
Home bias during the Eurozone Crisis 
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of Brutti and Sauré (2016) who only focus on the first part of the Eurozone crisis 
in their sample period with a limited coverage of European countries.4 
A related literature focuses on the risk-shifting tendency of undercapitalized 
banks. According to this argument, banks with low capital ratios prefer high-
risk instruments such as government bonds of crisis countries so that 
shareholders would benefit from a resurrection of the country while losses 
would be limited in case of a default. (Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Horváth et 
al., 2015). However, this argument does not necessarily explain why weak 
banks would especially risk-shift by accumulating domestic government bonds 
rather than the bonds of other governments struck by crisis. In line with 
Crosignani (2015), I find evidence that (potentially weak) banks located in crisis 
countries shift their sovereign portfolios more towards other countries in crisis, 
but this behaviour is found to be much more prominent when it is the domestic 
government that is in crisis. This indicates the need for a further investigation 
of the link between banks and domestic sovereign bond holdings. 
 
2.2 Home bias in other markets 
There is a massive literature on home bias in portfolio holdings of different 
asset classes. Most of this literature focuses on equity holdings (French and 
Poterba, 1991) whereas some recent studies look at the regional biases in 
international bond portfolios of various country groups (Lane, 2005). Previous 
studies mainly revolve around three broad categorical explanations for home 
bias: exchange rate risk, transaction costs in financial markets, and 
informational frictions (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013). In the specific context of 
Europe, with the increasing financial integration and exchange rate stability 
                                                 
 
4 Their sample period goes from 2007 to late 2011 and is mainly restricted to Eurozone countries 
with also some non-European countries such as Brazil and Mexico. 
Orkun Saka 
11 
over the years, a more realistic culprit for the recently sky-rocketing home bias 
would be the informational asymmetries. 
Brennan and Cao (1997), for example, model the sensitivity to asset-related 
news when there is a difference between the informational endowments of 
domestic and foreign agents. They illustrate that, in such a scenario, home bias 
would be positively associated with negative news as foreign investors would 
try to infer local information from past asset prices and react more to such 
news.5 Along similar lines, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) show 
that, in the existence of (even initially small) informational differences between 
foreign and domestic agents, the costly information acquisition process may 
boost the agents’ home bias. Lastly, Dziuda and Mondria (2012) demonstrate 
that, even in the existence of sophisticated investors such as investment funds, 
home bias may arise due to the fact that investors would be better at judging 
the performance of fund managers when they invest in local assets rather than 
foreign ones. Therefore, one might observe a home bias even in the portfolios 
of highly sophisticated institutions such as banks or mutual funds. 
Following the intuition that informational frictions might lie behind the 
widely-observed home bias for various asset classes,6 many researchers have 
empirically studied the effects of several forms of informational distance on 
portfolio holdings. For instance, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) find that 
geographical proximity is crucial for US investors’ portfolio composition and 
the risk-adjusted returns, even within the same country. Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) discover that investors might be biased towards firms that are 
                                                 
 
5 Inspired by Brennan and Cao (1997), there is a stream of studies in the asset-pricing literature 
that detect the foreign investors’ trend-following behaviour. See Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999; 2005); 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000); Froot, Oconnell, and Seasholes (2001); Kim and Wei (2002); 
Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004); Richards (2005); Edison and Warnock (2008). 
6 For further evidence on the informational advantage that domestic investors may hold vis-à-vis 
foreign investors, see Kang and Stulz (1997) and Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2005). 
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close to them in terms of physical location, culture and language of 
communication. Hau (2001) exemplifies this with a case in which professional 
traders located in Germany or in German-speaking cities make more profit in 
German stocks. Finally, Portes and Rey (2005) conclude that geographical 
distance matters for cross-border capital flows. However, it mostly matters 
because it proxies the effects of other informational variables such as bank 
branches across countries or telephone call traffic. I contribute to this literature 
by demonstrating that informational proxies (such as geographical distance, 
bank branches and past merger announcements) have had a significant effect 
on European banks’ sovereign portfolios during the Eurozone crisis. 
 
 
 
3. Data description 
The main body of data that I use in the paper comes from various stress-tests, 
transparency and recapitalization exercises that have been undertaken by the 
EBA over the course of 5 years for a large set of European banks covering 30 
members of the European Economic Area (EEA). The first of these disclosures 
was undertaken by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), 
which was comprised of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities 
and central banks of the European Union and later succeeded by the EBA. Its 
results were made public by national regulators at the time. However, the EBA 
does not provide the related data. Hence, this dataset was obtained from the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics while all other datasets were 
acquired from EBA. 
Table 1 lists these exercises and the disclosure dates for each of them together 
with how many banks and which information dates were covered. The 10 data 
time-points start from the first quarter of 2010 and go all the way to the second 
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quarter of 2015, thus covering the start, the rise, and the fall of the Eurozone 
crisis. Sovereign bond holdings are reported for each data time-point while 
private credit exposures (corporate, retail, etc.) can be found for 6 of these. In 
each disclosure, the full country-breakdown of each bank’s debt portfolio for 
up to 200 countries can be found.7 However, to focus on the debt reallocation 
across Europe, only exposures to 30 EEA countries are included in the sample. 
The main banks involved in the exercises mostly stay the same even though 
some smaller banks are added and subtracted from one exercise to another. All 
exposures are consolidated at the parent bank level and each exercise involves 
banks with at least 65% of the total banking assets in Europe and 50% of the 
banking sector of each EEA member. Some studies have already explored the 
sovereign bond holdings in the datasets of earlier EBA disclosures (De Marco 
and Macchiavelli, 2016; Horváth et al., 2015). However, to the best of my 
knowledge, this is the most comprehensive dataset compiled with all the 
sovereign and private debt exposures of European banks in all the tests 
undertaken and made public by the EBA until now. Compared to other studies 
using proprietary datasets from the ECB (Ongena et al., 2016; Altavilla et al., 
2016), EBA data covers banks from a wider range of countries (including non-
Eurozone) and documents finer granularity in terms of full country-
breakdowns of sovereign exposures at bank-level. 
 
                                                 
 
7 Except the first disclosure undertaken by CEBS in which only exposures to 30 European countries 
can be found. 
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I am mainly interested in what portion of a sovereign’s total debt is held by a 
specific bank. Thus the main variable of interest ( ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ) 
measures each bank’s (b) nominal exposure to a certain country (c) at a certain 
time-point (t) divided by the total nominal exposure of all the banks for that 
country at that time. That is; 
ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ൌ ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௕ǡ௖ǡ௧σ ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௕ǡ௖ǡ௧௕  
It is important to note that this measure is independent of the valuation 
technique used for the bank-level sovereign exposures as long as all the banks 
apply the same methodology at a given point in time, which is the case in my 
sample as all disclosures are centrally directed and homogenized by the EBA. 
This helps me better quantify the relative distribution of sovereign debt across 
banks. Furthermore, by construction, ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௕ǡ௖ǡ௧does not depend 
on price changes as these are automatically reflected in all banks’ nominal 
exposures and thus does not change the particular portion that a specific bank 
holds out of the total debt. Therefore, it constitutes an ideal measure to 
understand the reallocation of sovereign debt over time. 
In line with the mainstream literature on home bias (Ahearne, Griever, and 
Warnock, 2004; Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013), I also create an alternative variable 
that takes into account an optimal portion of sovereign debt that should be held 
by a bank according to a standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This 
variable (ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܤ݅ܽݏ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ) takes the difference between our main 
variable of interest (ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௕ǡ௖ǡ௧) and the portion that is suggested by 
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the CAPM model ( ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܥܣܲܯ௕ǡ௧ ). 8  As is conventional in the 
literature, this difference is standardized by the share of other banks’ portfolios 
in the global portfolio (ͳ െ ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܥܣܲܯ௕ǡ௧). That is;  
ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܤ݅ܽݏ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ൌ ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ െ ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܥܣܲܯ௕ǡ௧ͳ െ ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܥܣܲܯ௕ǡ௧  
where 
ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܥܣܲܯ௕ǡ௧ ൌ σ ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௕ǡ௖ǡ௧௖σ ܰ݋݈݉݅݊ܽܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௕ǡ௖ǡ௧௕ǡ௖  
If bias variable ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܤ݅ܽݏ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ takes the value of 1, it means all of 
the country’s debt is held by the specific bank, thus perfect home bias. If it is 
zero, that means the bank holds exactly the portion of the debt suggested by 
the CAPM model, thus no home bias. 
For the later section of the study, I create the corresponding variables for retail 
and corporate ( ܴ݁ݐ݈ܽ݅ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௕ǡ௖ǡ௧  & ܥ݋ݎ݌݋ݎܽݐ݁ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ) exposures 
separately (but exactly in the same way as described above) and then merge it 
with the sovereign exposure variables under a single variable name 
(ܦܾ݁ݐܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ௗǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧) where (d) denotes the type of debt in consideration. 
To construct the dummy variable ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧, the daily yields of 10-year maturity 
bonds of 30 European countries are obtained from Datastream.9 In the next 
step, I follow a similar approach to Brutti and Sauré (2016) and categorize a 
country as “in crisis” (ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧) if a country is a Euro member and its average 
                                                 
 
8 Notice that CAPM concludes that the optimal portion that a bank would hold in an equilibrium 
setting should depend only on the size of the bank’s sovereign portfolio and the size of the global 
sovereign portfolio. Hence, it does not depend on the specific country of exposure (c). 
9 Bond yields for two countries (Estonia and Liechtenstein) are not available on Datastream so 
these observations are dropped from the sample. 
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daily bond spreads (with respect to Germany) for the previous three months 
was above 400 basis points.10 
To be able to differentiate between different types of creditors, a measure of 
sovereign holdings for non-bank agents is needed. Unfortunately, EBA 
datasets only contain information about banks. Hence, I resort to a country-
level dataset compiled from various national sources by Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012), which lists the portion of a country’s total debt held by its resident 
banks and non-bank residents.11 Observations cover 11 European countries12 at 
quarterly intervals, starting from the 1990s. For consistency, I choose the same 
period covered by the EBA dataset, from 2010-Q1 to 2014-Q4. For the panel 
estimations with this dataset, I create a dependent variable called ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௖ǡ௞ǡ௧, which measures the portion of a country’s (c) debt held 
by a certain domestic creditor (k: ܴ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐݏܤܽ݊݇ݏ  or ܱݐ݄݁ݎܴ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐݏ ) at a 
certain time-point (t). 
To control for time-varying bank characteristics, I get the balance sheet items 
from Bankscope for the corresponding banks in the EBA datasets. In line with 
the recent literature (De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Horváth et al., 2015; 
Ongena et al., 2016), I include ܮ݋݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ which is the logarithm of the bank’s 
total assets (originally in million Euros); ܶ݅݁ݎͳȀܴܹܣ which is the Tier 1 capital 
of the bank as a percentage of its risk-weighted-assets; ܮ݋ܽ݊ݏȀܦ݁݌݋ݏ݅ݐݏ which 
is the net loans divided by the bank’s customer deposits. All bank-level 
                                                 
 
10 Various robustness checks are conducted later by using different crisis definitions (see Section 
4.6). 
11 Importantly for our purposes, the ‘other residents’ category does not include public agencies or 
central banks, so we can assume that these are private non-bank residents. 
12 These are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and United Kingdom. Data for Belgium and Finland can only be found annually so I linearly 
interpolated the data to get quarterly values for these two countries. 
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characteristics are end-of-the-year values and included with a year lag with 
respect to the observation date (t). 
Finally, to proxy the informational linkages across countries, I construct 3 
different variables in line with the previous home bias literature (Portes, Rey, 
and Oh, 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005). The first, ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௟ǡ௖ , 
measures the geographical distance (in thousand kilometers) between the 
capital city of the bank’s home country (l) and the capital city of the exposure 
country (c). The second, ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܤݎ݄ܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ௟ǡ௖, represents the total number 
of bank branches (in thousands) in the exposure country of the bank which 
ultimately belong to a bank from its home country. 13  Finally, ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܯ݁ݎ݃݁ݎݏ௟ǡ௖  is the total number of bank mergers (in hundreds) 
that occurred between the home country and the exposure country in the years 
starting from 1985 all the way up to the pre-crisis period (2008) in Europe. 
Geographical distance information is derived via MapQuest. The snapshot of 
banks’ branch networks as of February 2016 is acquired from SNL Financial14 
while the data on mergers comes from SDC Platinum. 
Table 2 gives summary statistics for these variables. It is important to note that 
for the ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ variable, more than half of the observations contain 
zero values. However, these are meaningful zeros, implying that the bank does 
not have any exposure to that sovereign at that point in time. When the mean 
                                                 
 
13 This variable is created by taking all of the ultimate-parent banks located in 30 EEA countries 
available in the SNL database, independent of whether the bank is included in the EBA dataset or 
not. The purpose here is to capture the non-time-varying banking linkages across countries. Hence, 
it is important to consider the full sample available rather than only the restricted EBA sample. 
This data covers 137,284 bank branches in total, which is 92% of all bank branches (149,242) in 
these countries, estimated using World Bank data for 2014  
(see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5). 
14  Unfortunately, the branch information is not available historically and SNL Financial only 
provides the most current data available. However, to the extent that the current data is 
representative of the non-time-varying cross-country banking linkages, it is reasonable to assume 
that estimates would not be biased in any particular direction. Additionally, the ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܯ݁ݎ݃݁ݎݏ௟ǡ௖  variable overcomes this timing problem by providing a pre-crisis 
picture of cross-country information linkages. 
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levels across general and domestic samples are compared, one can clearly see 
the inclination of the banks to hold a higher fraction of the government debt of 
their own countries. The same can also be said for retail debt (ܴ݁ݐ݈ܽ݅ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊). 
When we compare different debt categories for domestic bank samples, we see 
that a bank on average holds a higher fraction of its country’s retail debt (0.164) 
than it holds its country’s sovereign debt (0.126). This is consistent with the 
information asymmetry theory of home bias, predicting that – in general – 
informationally more sensitive assets (private debt) should suffer more from 
home bias than other more standardized assets (public debt) would do. 
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4. Methodology and results  
4.1 Sovereign home bias during crisis 
The first thing to capture is the effect of the crisis on the sovereign home bias of 
European banks. Hence, the first specification is: 
ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ൌ ߚଵ൫ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧ ൈ ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖൯ ൅ ߚ଴ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖  
    ൅ߜܤܽ݊݇ܨ݅݊௕ǡ௧ ൅ ߠ௕ ൅ ߛ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ߣ௟ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧  (1) 
where (l) denotes the home country of the bank, (b) identifies the specific bank, 
(c) is for the country of exposure and (t) specifies the time dimension. All 
variables are constructed as previously explained in the Data Description. 
Controls include time-varying bank financials as well as various fixed effects at 
the levels of ܤܽ݊݇ , ܪ݋݉݁ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕכܶ݅݉݁  and ܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕכܶ݅݉݁ . Thus, 
the model controls for the overall effects of the crisis both at the home country 
and exposure country levels and the ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ  dummy can only enter the 
regression as an interaction term. Additionally, ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖  is a dummy 
variable which is equal to 1 if the bank’s headquarters are located in the country 
of exposure (i.e. l=c). In this model, ߚ଴ should give us an idea about the general 
level and significance of the sovereign home bias in European banks and ߚଵ 
measures the additional effect of the crisis on this home bias. The same model 
is also estimated with the alternative dependent variable with the CAPM 
adjustment (ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܤ݅ܽݏ௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧). 
The results are presented in Table 3. Columns I-II confirm the previous 
literature in that banks do have home bias in their sovereign debt holdings. It 
is economically meaningful as well at a level around 0.126, clearly illustrating 
that a bank holds a much bigger portion of a country’s debt when it comes to 
its own country. Columns III-IV of the same table confirm another observation 
that is compatible with the previous literature: crisis increases the sovereign 
home bias of domestic banks (Gennaioli et al., 2014a; Brutti and Sauré, 2016). 
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The effect is economically huge: the portion of a country’s debt held by a 
representative domestic bank almost doubles in response to a crisis.15 Bank-
level controls are mostly significant in the expected directions: larger banks 
(ܮ݋݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ) hold more sovereign debt; well-capitalised banks (ܶ݅݁ݎͳȀܴܹܣ) 
hold less; bank loans (ܮ݋ܽ݊Ȁܦ݁݌݋ݏ݅ݐݏ) and sovereign debt act as substitutes. 
More interestingly, even though bank-level controls are no longer significant, 
the main results hold even when we take into account the relative portfolio size 
of the banks according to a standard CAPM model (see columns V-VIII). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15 This result is also compatible with the recent bank lending literature showing that, during a 
financial crisis, international banks demonstrate a stronger home bias in terms of syndicated loan 
issuance (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012) or cut credit less in markets that are geographically close 
(De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). 
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Table 3 
Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis 
Dependent Variable: SovereignPortion  SovereignPortionBias 
 I II III IV  V VI VII VIII 
Domestic*Crisis   0.110*** 0.108***    0.110*** 0.108*** 
   [ 3.72 ] [ 3.56 ]    [ 3.71 ] [ 3.55 ] 
Domestic 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.112***  0.127*** 0.128*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 [ 10.39 ] [ 10.06 ] [ 9.31 ] [ 8.84 ]  [ 10.47 ] [ 10.14 ] [ 9.39 ] [ 8.91 ] 
LogAssets  0.011***  0.011***   -0.000  -0.000 
  [ 2.98 ]  [ 2.98 ]   [ -0.03 ]  [ -0.03 ] 
Tier1/RWA  -0.001**  -0.001**   -0.000**  -0.000** 
  [ -2.26 ]  [ -2.26 ]   [ -1.99 ]  [ -1.99 ] 
Loans/Deposits  -0.000**  -0.000**   -0.000  -0.000 
  [ -2.13 ]  [ -2.13 ]   [ -0.10 ]  [ -0.10 ] 
Fixed Effects          
Bank Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x Time Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ExpCountry x Time Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Bank Bank Bank Bank  Bank Bank Bank Bank 
Adj-R-sq 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.27  0.26 0.25 0.27 0.27 
N 23268 20552 23268 20552  2368 20552 23268 20552 
*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
The table summarizes the results of equation (1) with dependent variables ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ (I-
IV) and ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܤ݅ܽݏ (V-VIII) estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone 
crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ is the portion of the 
total bank-debt of a sovereign held by a specific bank. ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ܤ݅ܽݏ is the portion of 
total bank-debt of a sovereign held by a specific bank, after adjusting for a standard CAPM model 
(see Data Description). ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ is a dummy variable equal to 1 only if the country of exposure is 
the same as the home country of the bank. ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a 
Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as the 
average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding the observation date. Bank-level 
Controls include ܮ݋݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ which is the logarithm of the bank’s total assets (originally in million 
Euros); ܶ݅݁ݎͳȀܴܹܣ which is the Tier 1 capital of the bank as a percentage of its risk-weighted-
assets; ܮ݋ܽ݊ݏȀܦ݁݌݋ݏ݅ݐݏ which is the net loans divided by bank’s customer deposits. All Bank-level 
Controls come from Bankscope and are used with a year lag. Sovereign bond holding data comes 
from various exercises of the EBA and country exposures are included for 30 members of the EEA. 
Bond yields for the ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ  dummy are obtained from Datastream. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
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4.2 Risk-shifting in crisis-country banks 
The findings in Table 3 are compatible with information asymmetry, secondary 
markets or moral suasion stories of the home bias. One may also argue that 
banks in crisis countries are especially weakly-capitalised, which drives them 
to invest more in their home country bonds to benefit from shifting the risk 
onto their creditors (Crosignani, 2015). However, if this is the case, one would 
expect these banks to also invest in other high-risk countries. 
To check for the risk-shifting tendency of banks located in troubled countries, 
I estimate the following model to separate the home bias phenomenon from the 
risk-shifting story: 
ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ൌ ߚଶ൫ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖ ൈ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧ ൈ ܵݐݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀ܤܽ݊݇௟ǡ௧൯ ൅ߚଵ൫ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧ ൈ ܵݐݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀ܤܽ݊݇௟ǡ௧൯ ൅ ߚ଴ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖ ൅ ߜܤܽ݊݇ܨ݅݊௕ǡ௧ ൅ߠ௕ ൅ ߛ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ߣ௟ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧      (2) 
where ܵݐݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀ܤܽ݊݇௟ǡ௧ is a dummy variable representing those observations in 
which the home country of the bank (l) is considered to be in crisis at a certain 
time (t). All other variables are constructed as previously explained. Due to 
time-varying fixed effects at the home country and exposure country levels, ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ and ܵݐݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀ܤܽ݊݇ dummies can only enter the regression in interaction 
with other variables.16 
Model 2 checks for risk-shifting behaviour of (potentially weak) banks located 
in crisis countries, in line with Crosignani (2015). If the rising home bias in crisis 
countries is mainly due to risk-shifting, one should observe a similar tendency 
of crisis-country banks to shift their portfolios towards all crisis countries no 
matter if it is domestic or foreign. This is captured by ߚଵ. On the other hand, ߚଶ 
                                                 
 
16  For conciseness, additional two-way interactions of ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿכܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ  and ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿכܵݐݎ݁ݏݏ݁݀ܤܽ݊݇  are dropped from the estimation since the coefficients are both 
insignificant and their inclusion does not change the results in any meaningful way.  
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measures the additional effect of the crisis on domestic exposures that cannot 
be explained by the general level of risk-shifting in these crisis-country banks. 
Columns I-II-V-VI in Table 4 confirm the earlier predictions by showing that 
crisis-country banks actually expand their relative exposure to all other crisis 
countries, thus potentially risk-shifting. However, as illustrated in columns III-
IV-VII-VIII, this behaviour is much heavier for the home exposures of these 
banks, thus indicating that risk-shifting contributes to the rising home bias in 
crisis countries but is not a sufficient explanation. The magnitude of the 
response to a crisis in the home country is more than tenfold higher than that 
to a crisis in a foreign country (0.101 vs 0.009). Indeed, banks located in troubled 
countries have a special preference for their own government’s bonds which 
goes much beyond their risk-shifting incentives. 
 
4.3 Secondary markets and redenomination risk 
As discussed previously, the secondary markets hypothesis states that the 
increase in banks’ sovereign home bias might be related to the presumption 
that government bonds would be more valuable (due to governments being 
less willing to default) when they are held domestically. Thus, in the existence 
of well-functioning secondary markets, debt would naturally flow from foreign 
to domestic agents. In addition, if redenomination (Eurozone break-up) risk 
was particularly high for crisis countries, this may have pushed up the selling 
pressure especially for the foreign investors since they may risk ending up with 
a currency mismatch between their assets and liabilities in case of a crisis 
country declaring its exit from the Eurosystem (Battistini, Pagano, and 
Simonelli, 2014).
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However, neither of these channels is specific to banks and, if they were 
prominent, one would expect to see a rising home bias not only for domestic 
banks but also for other types of agents in crisis countries. Hence, I differentiate 
the effect of the crisis on the home bias of different domestic agents operating 
in the same economy. For this purpose, I use the Bruegel dataset at the country-
level and estimate the following model: 
ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௖ǡ௞ǡ௧ ൌ ߚଵ൫ܴ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐܤܽ݊݇ݏ௞ ൈ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧൯ ൅ ߣ௞ ൅ ߛ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௖ǡ௞ǡ௧       (3) 
where (c) is for the country, (k) is for the creditor type and (t) is for different 
quarters of the year. ܴ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐܤܽ݊݇ݏ௞ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the creditor (k) of the country is its resident banks and zero if it is other private 
non-bank residents. All other variables are constructed as previously 
explained. Controls also include ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕכܶ݅݉݁  fixed effects, which should 
absorb all the time-varying country characteristics.17 The coefficient of interest 
is ߚଵ , which signals whether or not domestic banks behaved somewhat 
differently compared to other domestic agents. 
Table 5 compares the responses of two types of domestic agents during crisis. 
Although statistically insignificant, Columns I-II indicate that the crisis leads 
domestic agents to decrease their home bias on average, which is counter-
intuitive with respect our earlier findings. However, when I separate the 
additional effect of being a resident bank, columns III-IV confirm that resident 
banks in crisis countries are more likely to increase their home bias whereas 
other non-bank residents seem to have moved in the opposite direction. The 
conclusion holds even when overall shocks at the ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕכܶ݅݉݁  level are 
controlled for (column V). Hence, this finding goes against the secondary 
                                                 
 
17  Notice that with the creditor and country-time fixed effects, the ܴ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐܤܽ݊݇ݏ  and ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ 
dummies can only enter the regression in interaction form. 
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markets hypothesis arguing that, during crisis times, government debt should 
flow back to the home country irrespective of the resident type, since the 
government would then prefer keeping its promise not to harm the domestic 
economy. Although it could be argued that governments “care” more about 
the banking sector and hence it should be more reasonable that sovereign debt 
flows to resident banks, one would still expect to see a somewhat positive 
response for other non-bank residents as well, which does not seem to be 
visible in our findings. 
Furthermore, even though the Eurozone could be said to have come to the 
verge of a break-up in the midst of the crisis, it is not easy to conclude that 
redenomination risk was instrumental in banks’ sovereign exposure behaviour 
since it does not seem to have affected other types of investors resident in the 
same troubled countries. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that, since 
different investors may tend towards different kinds of domestic assets to 
hedge for the currency risk, the ideal setting to test for the redenomination risk 
would be the case in which we could see the creditor decomposition (bank vs 
non-bank) of all asset classes rather than only that of sovereign debt. However, 
in the absence of a more comprehensive dataset and a legitimate counter-
argument for why non-bank residents should especially avoid hedging via 
government bonds, it is safe to say that redenomination risk was not 
substantial. 
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Table 5 
Sovereign debt reallocation during crisis: Resident banks vs non-bank residents 
Dependent Variable: DomesticPortion I II  III IV  V 
Crisis -0.030 -0.025  -0.099*** -0.094***   
 [ -1.24 ] [ -1.32 ]  [ -3.05 ] [ -3.15 ]   
Crisis*ResidentBanks    0.139*** 0.139***  0.139** 
    [ 2.89 ] [ 2.88 ]  [ 2.14 ] 
Country-level Controls  Yes   Yes   
Fixed Effects        
Country Yes Yes  Yes Yes   
Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes   
Creditor Type Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Country x Time       Yes 
Clustering Country Country  Country Country  Country 
Adj-R-sq 0.03 0.04  0.13 0.14  0.20 
N 414 414  414 414  414 
*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
The table summarizes the results of equation (3) with dependent variable ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ (I-V), 
which is the portion of the overall sovereign debt of a country held by a particular domestic agent 
(either by resident banks or other private residents), estimated over a time period fully spanning 
the Eurozone crisis on a quarterly basis from early 2010 to the end-of-2014. ܴ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐܤܽ݊݇ݏ is a 
dummy variable equal to one only if the creditor is the resident banks of the country. ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) 
is above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period 
preceding the observation date. Country-level Controls are the average values for each country’s 
banks computed over the sample period and include ܮ݋݃ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ  which is the logarithm of the 
bank’s total assets (originally in million Euros); ܶ݅݁ݎͳȀܴܹܣ which is the Tier 1 capital of the bank 
as a percentage of its risk-weighted-assets; ܮ݋ܽ݊ݏȀܦ݁݌݋ݏ݅ݐݏ  which is the net loans divided by 
bank’s customer deposits. All Country-level Controls come from Bankscope and are used with a 
year lag. Domestic sovereign holding data come from the dataset compiled from various national 
sources by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). Countries include Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. Bond yields for ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ 
dummy are obtained from Datastream. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country-level 
and t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Sovereign vs. private debt home bias 
Most of the recent literature has focused on European banks’ sovereign home 
bias although this behaviour might have been just a sub-observation of a more 
general phenomenon. Thus, I would also like to compare the eect of the crisis 
on home bias across various asset classes held by European banks. For this 
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purpose, I use a more generalized model in order to be able to dierentiate the 
home bias across asset classes in both normal and crisis times: 
ܦܾ݁ݐܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ௗǡ௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ൌ ߚଷ൫ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ௗ ൈ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧ ൈ ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௧൯ ൅ ߚଶ൫ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧ ൈܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖൯ ൅ ߚଵ൫ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ௗ ൈܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖൯ ൅ ߚ଴൫ܴ݁ݐ݈ܽ݅ௗ ൈ ܦ݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ௟ǡ௖൯ ൅ߜܤܽ݊݇ܨ݅݊௕ǡ௧ ൅ ߞௗ ൅ ߠ௕ ൅ ߛ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ߣ௟ǡ௧ ൅ ߝௗǡ௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧      (4) 
 
 where ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ௗ and ܴ݁ݐ݈ܽ݅ௗ are dummy variables indicating the respective 
asset classes. All other variables are constructed as previously explained.18 The 
coefficients ߚଵ  and ߚ଴  should give us an idea about the home bias in these 
dierent asset classes in general. ߚଶ reflects the overall eect of the crisis on the 
home bias for both asset classes and ߚଷ should tell us if the increase in home 
bias was stronger for sovereign debt, as would be suggested by the competing 
theories of home bias (moral suasion and secondary market theory).  
To get a better sense of whether sovereign debt was the only asset that suered 
from home bias during the crisis, Table 6 draws the following comparison: 
Columns I-II confirm that there is a significant home bias across both asset 
classes together. When I separate the home bias for dierent assets, columns 
III-IV show that the magnitude of the general home bias for retail debt (0.171) 
is more than 30 percent higher than the one for sovereign debt (0.127) and the 
dierence between these two coefficients is statistically significant, which is 
perfectly in line with the information asymmetry theory of home bias. 
Compared to standard products such as government securities, 
informationally more sensitive assets such as retail debt should be held more 
by the domestic agents who have an advantage in reaching the relevant 
information for such assets (Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005). 
                                                 
 
18 To focus on the main coefficients of interest, the two-way interaction of ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊כܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ  is 
dropped from the estimation since the coefficient is statistically insignificant and its inclusion does 
not change the results in any meaningful way. 
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The remaining columns in Table 6 provide even more interesting results. 
Columns V-VI show that the crisis has a positively significant eect on home 
bias for both asset classes. Columns VII-VIII shed light on the additional 
response of sovereign debt to the crisis, but there seems to be none. At best, this 
additional eect is negative (-0.032, though not statistically significant), 
meaning that it was retail debt that suered more intensely from home bias in 
times of crisis. This finding is again consistent with the expectation that, during 
crisis episodes that are usually associated with rising informational frictions, 
informationally sensitive assets should experience a much deeper reallocation 
from foreign to domestic agents. For robustness, the same analysis is repeated 
with corporate debt in Table R.6. Not surprisingly, the results are very much in 
line: in general, European banks have a greater home bias in their corporate 
exposures and, compared to sovereign debt, this bias rises at least equally in 
response to a crisis in a country. Overall, it seems that the recent sovereign debt 
reallocation in Europe could be a part of a more general phenomenon (such as 
informational frictions) that may have influenced all asset classes 
simultaneously. 
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4.5 Eect of informational distance on banks’ sovereign exposure 
It is already well established in the literature that proximity to the borrower 
matters for banks’ lending behaviour and it usually determines the amount of 
soft information that the bank can gather to serve its customers.19 Of course, 
one could think that government bond markets are not necessarily of the kind 
where soft information would matter the most. Indicators (such as tax revenue 
or fiscal balance) showing the strength of a government’s ability to pay back its 
debts are publicly available and easily accessible by market participants. 
Nevertheless, an interesting feature of government debt markets is that while 
corporate bankruptcy is always about the (in)ability of a company to repay, a 
sovereign default is – in most cases – a political decision and directly related to 
the degree of the governing party’s willingness to cut back government 
spending or increase tax rates. This crucial difference between corporate and 
sovereign debt arises due to the lack of a legal mechanism to enforce repayment 
on sovereign bonds (Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer, 2009) and makes 
it especially important in times of stress to have insider information on the 
government’s willingness to honour its promises or the country’s political 
capacity to endure further budget cuts. Such soft information could be obtained 
via domestic banks’ local/political connections or simply by being more 
familiar with the country, its daily news and local economic and political 
climate. 20  In that respect, Butler (2008) illustrates a case in which local 
investment banks underwriting municipal bonds have a comparative 
                                                 
 
19  See, among many others, Mian (2006), Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2009) and 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2010). 
20  Here, I interpret familiarity as an accumulated informational advantage rather than a 
behavioural bias although the previous literature is somewhat ambiguous on this (see Huberman, 
2001). 
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advantage in accessing and assessing soft information, especially when the 
bond is risky. 
What is then so special about domestic banks compared to other types of 
domestic agents? First, domestic banks are the main players in the government 
debt markets. Figure 3 clearly illustrates that even before the crisis in the Euro 
periphery, domestic banks held a higher share of sovereign debt than all other 
domestic agents combined. This could give the banks a comparative edge in 
the pricing of government securities.21 Second, banks are natural information-
gatherers for their economies. They transact with almost every sector of 
domestic business and gain in-advance information on how well the overall 
economy may perform over the coming months/quarters, which would have a 
tremendous effect on the government’s ability to raise tax revenues and pay 
back its debts. Lastly, banks are the agents with the greatest access to liquidity 
(via central banks) in times of financial crises. Hence, in a liquidity crunch, 
governments may find it easier to signal their intentions/plans to local banks 
than to any other local agent. 
In light of the above discussion, I expect cross-country informational linkages 
to be important for European banks’ sovereign exposures both at home and 
abroad. Figure 4 depicts the bank branch network in 30 EEA countries and it 
appears that the Eurozone crisis particularly struck the countries located in the 
outer sphere of this network, which may have caused these sovereigns to be 
especially susceptible to informational frictions. Additionally, larger nodes in 
crisis countries imply that their banking sector is dominated by domestic 
                                                 
 
21  Home bias might also arise simply due to domestic banks’ responsibility to act as primary 
dealers or market makers in the sovereign debt markets. Ongena et al. (2016) provide the contrary 
evidence that most of the market makers in periphery countries during the crisis were foreign 
banks and this did not have any effect on domestic banks’ home bias. 
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banks, which might be the reason why debt flew back to these countries in large 
quantities. 
 
Figure 4 
Bank branch network across European countries 
 
The graph shows a simple network map for all the bank branch connections across 30 EEA 
countries. Crisis countries (Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Spain) are in red 
and others are in blue. Each arrow represents a connection between two countries with the 
direction of the arrow pointing from home country towards the host. Nodes are placed via 
multidimensional scaling procedure with a random component and the size of the nodes 
(݋ݓ݊̴ݎܽݐ݅݋) represents the percentage of the total branches in a country that belongs to domestic 
banks. Bank branch data come from SNL Financial as of February, 2016. 
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Figure 5 
Bank merger network across European countries 
 
The graph shows a simple network map for all the bank merger connections across 30 EEA 
countries. Crisis countries (Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Spain) are in red 
and others are in blue. Each arrow represents a connection between two countries with the 
direction of the arrow pointing from home country towards the host. Nodes are placed via 
multidimensional scaling procedure with a random component and the size of the nodes 
(݋ݓ̴݊ݎܽݐ݅݋) represents the percentage of the total mergers in a country that belongs to domestic 
banks. Bank merger data come from SDC Platinum and cover the years between 1985 and 2008. 
 
Figure 5, which depicts bank merger networks, tells more or less the same 
story. Hence, I go on to formally estimate the eect of informational distance 
on European banks’ behaviour towards crisis countries: 
ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧ ൌ ߚଵ൫ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௟ǡ௖ ൈ ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ௖ǡ௧൯ ൅ ߜܤܽ݊݇ܨ݅݊௕ǡ௧ ൅ߠ௕ ൅ ߛ௖ǡ௧ ൅ ߣ௟ǡ௧ ൅ ߤ݈ǡܿ ൅ ߝ௟ǡ௕ǡ௖ǡ௧      (5) 
where, in addition to the previous ones, I also include fixed eects at the level 
of interaction between home country and exposure country (ߤ௟ǡ௖) so that all 
non-time-varying structural cross-country linkages can be implicitly 
controlled. Hence, ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܦ݅ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௟ǡ௖ only enters the regression in 
interaction. Alternatively, I use ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܤݎ݄ܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ௟ǡ௖  and 
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ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܯ݁ݎ݃݁ݎݏ௟ǡ௖  as proxies that would capture the informational 
channel during crisis. 
Table 7 presents the eects of informational distance on banks’ exposures to 
crisis countries. The first thing to notice is that the explanatory power 
(adjusted-r-square) of the model increases significantly due to the fixed eects 
at ܪ݋݉݁ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕכܧݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁ܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕ  level, implying that cross-country 
linkages matter substantially for the European banks’ sovereign portfolios. 
Although geography could be thought of as a noisy proxy for informational 
linkages across countries,22 especially in Europe given the fully open borders 
and easy transportation, columns I-II illustrate that physical distance has a 
significant negative eect on bank exposures in times of crisis. One standard 
deviation increase in distance (0.83) lowers a bank’s sovereign portion holding 
of a crisis country by almost one percent. Given that the sample mean of ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊  is 0.012 in the full sample, the eect is quite sizable and 
economically meaningful. Similarly, branch and merger connections, which are 
better proxies for information, are also significant and positively associated 
with the banks’ exposures to crisis countries (see columns III-VI).
                                                 
 
22 One could also think that distance should be positively associated with asset holdings since more 
distant countries would offer better diversification benefits due to the lower correlation in 
business cycles across countries (Portes and Rey, 2005). 
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However, the full sample in these estimations also contains domestic 
observations, which are highly correlated with information variables; and may 
thus bias the results if there is a moral suasion or secondary market eect in 
these domestic observations. Thus, I take a much more conservative approach 
and drop all the domestic observations from the sample. All remaining 
observations denote the foreign exposures of the banks, hence – in theory – they 
must be independent of moral suasion or secondary market eects. Notice that 
this is a very conservative approach in the sense that the informational linkages 
that this paper argued for so far have mostly emphasized the link between 
governments and their domestic banks. Furthermore, there is the possibility of 
“reverse moral suasion” on foreign banks, in which the national regulators may 
have forced their banks to specifically drop their exposures to the troubled 
countries (Ongena et al., 2016). In that case, such pressure would be most 
pronounced for better-connected banks which, even before the crisis, may have 
had higher exposures to crisis countries. Thus, focusing only on foreign bank 
observations would severely underestimate the importance of the information 
channel during a crisis.  
With these concerns in mind, columns VII-VIII in Table 7 show that the eect 
of geographical distance becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero 
when we only consider the exposures of foreign banks, which is not surprising 
given the noisy nature of this proxy. On the other hand, columns IX-XII confirm 
that branch and merger variables are still influential in the behaviour of foreign 
banks towards crisis countries. Although statistical significance goes down in 
the subsample, the magnitude of the coefficients goes up. One standard 
deviation increase in ܥݎ݋ݏݏܥ݋ݑ݊ݐݎݕܤݎ݄ܽ݊ܿ݁ݏ  (1.86) shoots up the sovereign 
portion by more than 0.9 percent, which is sizable given the sample average of 
1.2 percent for ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊. Independent of alternative explanations of 
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home bias, this finding constitutes direct and strong evidence for the role of 
informational frictions on debt reallocation in times of crisis. 
 
4.6 Further analysis and policy implications 
The first thing that comes to mind is whether the estimations are robust to 
reasonable changes in the crisis definition. Table 8 and Table 9 present all the 
main results with crisis thresholds of 300 and 500 basis points for bond spreads 
instead of my main definition of 400bps. All the main results still hold 
although, expectedly, they get weaker with a higher threshold and stronger 
with a lower threshold. 
Secondly, it might be the case that a country could get into a crisis faster than a 
three-month period, which is the rolling window that I use to compute the 
average spreads for each time period (t). However, Table 10 shows that results 
are also robust to the choice of a shorter rolling period for the average bond 
spreads. 
Thirdly, by choosing a threshold, the assumption was that sovereign risk must 
have a non-linear eect on debt reallocation. That is, debt reallocation should 
occur only at the very peak levels of sovereign stress. However, this condition 
could be relaxed as well. Therefore, instead of using a crisis definition, Table 11 
presents the main results with a continuous ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀ݏ variable. It seems that all 
of the interpretations stay the same except the evidence of risk-shifting 
disappearing in column 4. 
 
 
 
Home bias during the Eurozone crisis 
42 
 
Table 8 
Main results with crisis threshold of 300 basis points 
Dependent Variable: SovereignPortion 
Table 3 4 5 6 7 (Full) 7 (Foreign) 
Domestic 0.109*** 0.109***     
 [ 8.26 ] [ 8.25 ]     
Domestic*Crisis 0.096***      
 [ 3.64 ]      
StressedBank*Crisis  0.009***     
  [ 2.85 ]     
StressedBank*Crisis*Domestic  0.091***     
  [ 3.46 ]     
Crisis*ResidentBanks   0.133*    
   [ 1.87 ]    
Domestic*Retail    0.153***   
    [ 6.92 ]   
Domestic*Sovereign    0.110***   
    [ 8.28 ]   
Domestic*Crisis    0.109**   
    [ 2.46 ]   
Domestic*Crisis*Sovereign    -0.015   
    [ -0.41 ]   
CrossCountryBranches*Crisis     0.004*** 0.005** 
     [ 4.61 ] [ 2.36 ] 
Bank-level Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects       
Bank Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
ExpCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x ExpCountry     Yes Yes 
Debt Type    Yes   
Country   Yes    
Creditor Type   Yes    
Country x Time   Yes    
Clustering Bank Bank Country Bank Bank Bank 
Adj-R-sq 0.27 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.54 0.27 
N 20552 20552 414 32530 20552 19818 
*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
The table summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with the dependent 
variable ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a 
biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. For the definitions of variables, see Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 7. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. 
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Table 9 
Main results with crisis threshold of 500 basis points 
Dependent Variable: SovereignPortion 
Table 3 4 5 6 7 (Full) 7 (Foreign) 
Domestic 0.117*** 0.117***     
 [ 9.53 ] [ 9.52 ]     
Domestic*Crisis 0.122***      
 [ 2.90 ]      
StressedBank*Crisis  0.017***     
  [ 4.03 ]     
StressedBank*Crisis*Domestic  0.107***     
  [ 2.64 ]     
Crisis*ResidentBanks   0.157**    
   [ 2.34 ]    
Domestic*Retail    0.164***   
    [ 7.64 ]   
Domestic*Sovereign    0.118***   
    [ 9.55 ]   
Domestic*Crisis    0.104*   
    [ 1.68 ]   
Domestic*Crisis*Sovereign    0.015   
    [ 0.29 ]   
CrossCountryBranches*Crisis     0.011** 0.016* 
     [ 2.16 ] [ 1.67 ] 
Bank-level Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects       
Bank Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
ExpCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x ExpCountry     Yes Yes 
Debt Type    Yes   
Country   Yes    
Creditor Type   Yes    
Country x Time   Yes    
Clustering Bank Bank Country Bank Bank Bank 
Adj-R-sq 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.53 0.27 
N 20552 20552 414 32530 20552 19818 
*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
The table summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with the dependent 
variable ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a 
biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. For the definitions of variables, see Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 7. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. 
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Table 10 
Main results with crisis dummy defined with one-month-rolling bond spreads 
Dependent Variable: SovereignPortion 
Table 3 4 5 6 7 (Full) 7 (Foreign) 
Domestic 0.113*** 0.113***     
 [ 8.96 ] [ 8.95 ]     
Domestic*Crisis 0.106***      
 [ 3.31 ]      
StressedBank*Crisis  0.010***     
  [ 3.38 ]     
StressedBank*Crisis*Domestic  0.099***     
  [ 3.15 ]     
Crisis*ResidentBanks   0.141**    
   [ 2.16 ]    
Domestic*Retail    0.158***   
    [ 7.40 ]   
Domestic*Sovereign    0.114***   
    [ 8.98 ]   
Domestic*Crisis    0.125**   
    [ 2.22 ]   
Domestic*Crisis*Sovereign    -0.020   
    [ -0.44 ]   
CrossCountryBranches*Crisis     0.004*** 0.004* 
     [ 4.41 ] [ 1.78 ] 
Bank-level Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects       
Bank Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
ExpCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x ExpCountry     Yes Yes 
Debt Type    Yes   
Country   Yes    
Creditor Type   Yes    
Country x Time   Yes    
Clustering Bank Bank Country Bank Bank Bank 
Adj-R-sq 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.53 0.27 
N 20552 20552 414 32530 20552 19818 
*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
The table summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with the dependent 
variable ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a 
biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. For the definitions of variables, see Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 7. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. 
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Table 11 
Main results with crisis dummy replaced with bond spreads 
Dependent Variable: SovereignPortion 
Table 3 4 5 6 7 (Full) 7 (Foreign) 
Domestic 0.097*** 0.114***     
 [ 7.54 ] [ 9.19 ]     
Domestic*Spread 0.017***      
 [ 3.72 ]      
HomeSpread*ExpSpread  0.000     
  [ 1.46 ]     
HomeSpread*ExpSpread*Domestic  0.001***     
  [ 2.80 ]     
Spread*ResidentBanks   0.012**    
   [ 2.04 ]    
Domestic*Retail    0.134***   
    [ 6.79 ]   
Domestic*Sovereign    0.099***   
    [ 7.59 ]   
Domestic*Spread    0.023***   
    [ 3.01 ]   
Domestic*Spread*Sovereign    -0.006   
    [ -0.92 ]   
CrossCountryBranches*Spread     0.002*** 0.006*** 
     [ 5.34 ] [ 2.71 ] 
Bank-level Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects       
Bank Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
ExpCountry x Time Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
HomeCountry x ExpCountry     Yes Yes 
Debt Type    Yes   
Country   Yes    
Creditor Type   Yes    
Country x Time   Yes    
Clustering Bank Bank Country Bank Bank Bank 
Adj-R-sq 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.54 0.27 
N 20552 20552 414 32530 20552 19818 
*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. 
The table summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with the dependent 
variable ܵ݋ݒ݁ݎ݁݅݃݊ܲ݋ݎݐ݅݋݊ estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a 
biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. For the definitions of variables, see Tables 3, 4, 5, 6 
and 7. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in 
brackets. 
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These findings clearly challenge the recent literature in Eurozone studies 
focusing solely on the home bias in sovereign debt. One might argue that, in 
the age of technology and well-integrated markets such as in Europe, 
information must be cheap to attain so huge asymmetries in the markets should 
not arise. However, the theoretical literature illustrates that even initially small 
dierences in informational standings of domestic and foreign agents may lead 
them to focus on these dierences rather than spending eort to seek 
information related to foreign assets (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). 
Furthermore, recent studies on sovereign credit risk prices in the Eurozone 
provide evidence that, at the peak of the crisis, there were great discrepancies 
between the bond yields (or CDS spreads) and the macro fundamentals of the 
countries in the Euro periphery, which is interpreted as a sign of market panic 
(De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Saka et al., 2015). In such circumstances, it is not 
unreasonable to expect domestic or government-related banks to benefit from 
their superior informational position and collect sovereign bonds while foreign 
banks were leaving the debt market in a rush. In fact, some studies already 
show that banks that loaded up periphery country bonds during the crisis 
benefited from this as the crisis pressures eased (Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and 
Hirsch, 2016b). 
Another counter-argument might be that there is a growing literature on how 
increasing sovereign exposures had negative spillovers on the private lending 
of European banks, which may signal that the sovereign exposure behaviour 
was partly involuntary for these banks (Acharya et al., 2016a; Altavilla et al., 
2016; Popov and Van Horen, 2015). Still, Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura 
(2014) clearly illustrate that, in the existence of frictions in financial markets, 
sovereign exposures may crowd out private lending without necessarily 
implying involuntary or forced behaviour on the part of banks. Additionally, 
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some recent studies that argue in favor of moral suasion do not even find any 
negative eect of sovereign exposures on private lending (Ongena et al., 2016).  
A key policy conclusion of this paper is that if the information channel gets 
active between governments and their domestic banks in the midst of a crisis, 
this may be considered a stabilizing force compared to a situation where even 
domestic banks would rush out of the market and governments would find it 
impossible to rollover their debt. Further policy discussions may also focus on 
increasing transparency in the sovereign debt market, especially in times of 
crisis, rather than merely shifting the regulatory power from national to 
supranational institutions or coming up with various innovations of debt 
issuance in order to cut o the diabolic loop between sovereigns and their 
banks (see Brunnermeier, Garicano, Lane, Pagano,Reis, Santos, Thesmar, Van 
Nieuwerburgh, and Vayanos, 2016). 
 
5. Conclusion 
In contrast to the recent literature on rising sovereign debt home bias across 
European banks, this paper argues that this phenomenon is not surprising if 
one takes into account one of the most conventional (albeit lately forgotten) 
theories of the home bias in asset markets: informational frictions.  
By taking a global portfolio approach and using a novel bank-level dataset 
compiled from various stress-tests, transparency and capital exercises of the 
EBA, I show that home bias increased and sovereign debt was indeed 
reallocated from foreign to domestic banks at the peak of the crisis. Although 
it cannot fully explain the rising home bias in response to the crisis, the risk-
shifting tendency of crisis-country banks seems to make a contribution. In 
contrast to what the secondary market theory of sovereign home bias predicts, 
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this reallocation was not visible at all for domestic agents other than banks; a 
finding that is compatible with the information asymmetry theory of home bias 
given the informational advantages that banks enjoy in comparison to other 
local agents concerning the sovereign debt of their local governments. 
Additionally, I demonstrate that, in response to a crisis, private forms of debt 
(retail and corporate) in bank balance sheets have experienced an equally large 
(if not larger) jump in home bias than the one observed for public debt. This is 
in sharp contradiction to the moral suasion story unless one assumes 
retail/corporate borrowers can somehow force the domestic banks to lend to 
them. On the other hand, this finding is exactly what one would expect from 
informationally more sensitive assets (such as private debt) if crisis episodes 
were associated with informational frictions. Finally, I present a clear 
information channel and demonstrate that foreign banks informationally 
better-linked to crisis countries have relatively increased their exposures 
during the crisis.  
If the information channel was operational, as argued in this paper, it is 
expected that the reallocation would be concentrated on banks that were 
closely linked to the government. Hence, the conclusions of recent studies 
arguing in favour of moral suasion based on positive correlations between the 
government-relatedness of the banks and their domestic bond holdings might 
be biased unless they could control for the apparent informational linkages 
between the two. More research is needed to dierentiate these two channels. 
On the other hand, future policy discussions may benefit from focusing on 
increasing transparency in the sovereign debt market rather than merely trying 
to shift the regulatory mechanisms from national to supranational institutions 
or coming up with various innovations of debt issuance in order to overcome 
the so-called doom loop between sovereigns and banks. 
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